Anonymity on QuickSand: Using BGP to Compromise Tor Laurent Vanbever, Oscar Li, Jennifer Rexford, Prateek Mittal Princeton University {vanbever,jrex {oli,pmittal ABSTRACT - EENet - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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Date: 2014-10-08 09:38:20 Internet security Internet Standards Internet protocols Routing Secure communication IP hijacking Border Gateway Protocol Tor Traffic analysis Onion routing HTTPS Computer network		Anonymity on QuickSand: Using BGP to Compromise Tor Laurent Vanbever, Oscar Li, Jennifer Rexford, Prateek Mittal Princeton University {vanbever,jrex}@cs.princeton.edu {oli,pmittal}@princeton.edu ABSTRACT Add to Reading List Source URL: vanbever.eu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 985,30 KB Share Document on Facebook

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