Algorithmic Game Theory Summer 2015, Week 11 Non-Truthful Mechanisms Beyond the Worst-Case Or: How Google Got So Incredibly Rich

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Date: 2016-01-25 09:13:39 Game theory Auction theory Auctions Decision theory Gaming Mechanism design Vickrey auction Sponsored search auction VickreyClarkeGroves auction Nash equilibrium VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Economic equilibrium		Algorithmic Game Theory Summer 2015, Week 11 Non-Truthful Mechanisms Beyond the Worst-Case Or: How Google Got So Incredibly Rich Add to Reading List Source URL: www.cadmo.ethz.ch Download Document from Source Website File Size: 184,89 KB Share Document on Facebook

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