Matching Models for Preference-sensitive Group Purchasing TYLER LU, University of Toronto CRAIG BOUTILIER, University of Toronto Matching buyers and sellers is one of the most fundamental problems in economics and market

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Date: 2012-05-07 08:05:36 Commerce Game theory Economics Group buying Tuángòu Matching Futures contract Mechanism design Stable marriage problem Business Pricing Marketing		Matching Models for Preference-sensitive Group Purchasing TYLER LU, University of Toronto CRAIG BOUTILIER, University of Toronto Matching buyers and sellers is one of the most fundamental problems in economics and market Add to Reading List Source URL: www.cs.toronto.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 417,49 KB Share Document on Facebook

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