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Economics / Mathematics / Structure / Partnerships / Stable marriage problem / Alternative medicine / Matching / Public goods game / Nash equilibrium / Game theory / Business law / Types of business entity
Date: 2014-08-10 21:21:47
Economics
Mathematics
Structure
Partnerships
Stable marriage problem
Alternative medicine
Matching
Public goods game
Nash equilibrium
Game theory
Business law
Types of business entity

The University of Adelaide School of Economics Research Paper No[removed]April 2011

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Source URL: economics.adelaide.edu.au

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