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Economics / Guggenheim Fellows / Game theory / Cooperative games / Lloyd Shapley / Alvin E. Roth / Stable marriage problem / Fellows of the Econometric Society / Science / Mathematics
Date: 2013-10-18 06:47:17
Economics
Guggenheim Fellows
Game theory
Cooperative games
Lloyd Shapley
Alvin E. Roth
Stable marriage problem
Fellows of the Econometric Society
Science
Mathematics

PRESSMEDDELANDE Press release 15 O ctober 2012

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