Approximation and Collusion in Multicast Cost Sharing 1 Aaron Archer2 Cornell University, Operations Research Dept., Ithaca, NYE-mail: and Joan Feigenbaum3 Arvind Krishnamurthy4 Rahul Sami

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Date: 2004-03-26 13:36:19 Mechanism design Game theory Mathematics Information Cost-sharing mechanism Strategyproofness Algorithmic mechanism design VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Multicast Shortest path problem Algorithmic		Approximation and Collusion in Multicast Cost Sharing 1 Aaron Archer2 Cornell University, Operations Research Dept., Ithaca, NYE-mail: and Joan Feigenbaum3 Arvind Krishnamurthy4 Rahul Sami Add to Reading List Source URL: cs-www.cs.yale.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 340,19 KB Share Document on Facebook

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