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Investment / Social security / Financial institutions / Institutional investors / Economics / Health insurance / Adverse selection / Social insurance / Welfare / Insurance / Social programs / Financial economics


Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance Raj Chetty, Harvard University and NBER Emmanuel Saez, UC Berkeley and NBER October 19, 2009
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Document Date: 2009-11-09 13:19:50


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Berne / /

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Switzerland / United States / /

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franc / /

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Harvard University / /

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Organization

Harvard University / Sloan Foundation / National Science Foundation / UC Berkeley / NBER / International Labor Organization / OECD / Medicare / /

Person

Roger Gordon / Amy Finkelstein / Pierre Pestieau / Thomas Piketty / Andrew Clark / Emmanuel Saez / Ken Judd / /

Position

General / planner / /

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