<--- Back to Details
First PageDocument Content
Economy / Economic theories / Business / Industrial organization / Economics / Incomplete contracts / Theory of the firm / Complete contract / Bargaining / Environmental scanning electron microscope
Date: 2015-05-21 10:29:19
Economy
Economic theories
Business
Industrial organization
Economics
Incomplete contracts
Theory of the firm
Complete contract
Bargaining
Environmental scanning electron microscope

Microsoft Word - SFB_Newsletter_September 2012

Add to Reading List

Source URL: www.sfbtr15.de

Download Document from Source Website

File Size: 187,43 KB

Share Document on Facebook

Similar Documents

Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New Thoughts By Oliver Hart and John Moore* Since Ronald H. Coase’s famous 1937 article, economists have grappled with the question of what characterizes a firm and what determi

Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New Thoughts By Oliver Hart and John Moore* Since Ronald H. Coase’s famous 1937 article, economists have grappled with the question of what characterizes a firm and what determi

DocID: 1sRCt - View Document

Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation Author(s): Oliver Hart and John Moore Source: Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Jul., 1988), ppPublished by: The Econometric Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/19

Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation Author(s): Oliver Hart and John Moore Source: Econometrica, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Jul., 1988), ppPublished by: The Econometric Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/19

DocID: 1sQfo - View Document

Inequality, Incomplete Contracts, and the Size Distribution of Business Firms∗ Thomas Gall† JEPS Working Paper Nohttp://jeps.repec.org/paperspdf July 2005

Inequality, Incomplete Contracts, and the Size Distribution of Business Firms∗ Thomas Gall† JEPS Working Paper Nohttp://jeps.repec.org/paperspdf July 2005

DocID: 1r741 - View Document

Microsoft Word - SFB_Newsletter_September 2012

Microsoft Word - SFB_Newsletter_September 2012

DocID: 1pSWd - View Document

Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information∗ Helmut Bester†and Daniel Kr¨ahmer‡ March 28, 2012  Abstract

Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information∗ Helmut Bester†and Daniel Kr¨ahmer‡ March 28, 2012 Abstract

DocID: 1pP6c - View Document