M PRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division Steven J. Brams and Michael A. Jones and Christian Klamler

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Date: 2013-02-12 20:45:19 Problem solving Gaming Decision theory Envy-free Steven Brams Expected value Fraction Envy Pareto efficiency Fair division Game theory Welfare economics		M PRA Munich Personal RePEc Archive N-Person cake-cutting: there may be no perfect division Steven J. Brams and Michael A. Jones and Christian Klamler Add to Reading List Source URL: mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 221,38 KB Share Document on Facebook

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