1 Introduction to Computational Social Choice Felix Brandta , Vincent Conitzerb , Ulle Endrissc , J´erˆ ome Langd , and Ariel D. Procacciae

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Date: 2015-06-13 14:35:16 Social choice theory Voting theory Voting Economics Group decision-making Arrow's impossibility theorem Independence of irrelevant alternatives Condorcet paradox Computational social choice Social welfare function Condorcet criterion Preference		1 Introduction to Computational Social Choice Felix Brandta , Vincent Conitzerb , Ulle Endrissc , J´erˆ ome Langd , and Ariel D. Procacciae Add to Reading List Source URL: users.cs.duke.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 333,80 KB Share Document on Facebook

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