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Commerce / Auction / Combinatorial auction / Reverse auction / Mechanism design / Bidding / Erik Demaine / Bid / Auctioneering / Business / Auction theory
Date: 2005-05-19 23:43:34
Commerce
Auction
Combinatorial auction
Reverse auction
Mechanism design
Bidding
Erik Demaine
Bid
Auctioneering
Business
Auction theory

Computing with Strategic Agents by Nicole Immorlica Submitted to the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science

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