Sophisticated Experience-weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games

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Date: 2002-03-25 11:33:19 Mathematics Academia Game theory Outcome Teck-Hua Ho Quantal response equilibrium Nash equilibrium Signaling game Normal-form game Human behavior Experimental economics		Sophisticated Experience-weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games Add to Reading List Source URL: people.hss.caltech.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 789,19 KB Share Document on Facebook

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