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Microeconomics / Game theory / Economics / Market / Auction theory / Mechanism design / General equilibrium theory / Competitive equilibrium / Mathematical economics / Pareto efficiency / Price of anarchy / Fisher market
Date: 2016-06-17 20:21:23
Microeconomics
Game theory
Economics
Market
Auction theory
Mechanism design
General equilibrium theory
Competitive equilibrium
Mathematical economics
Pareto efficiency
Price of anarchy
Fisher market

Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents∗ Simina Brˆanzei Hebrew U. of Jerusalem Vasilis Gkatzelis

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