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Subgame / Mechanism design / Repurchase agreement / Bayesian game / Game theory / Economics / Problem solving


Subgame Perfect Implementation under Perfect and Almost Perfect Information: An Empirical Test Philippe Aghion, Ernst Fehr, Richard Holden, Tom Wilkening∗ July 26, 2012 Abstract
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Document Date: 2014-08-15 00:43:42

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Australia / /

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Max Planck Institute / /

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Andy Postlewaite / Jacob Goeree / Grossman / Oliver Hart / Tom Wilkening / Ernst Fehr / Martin Hellwig / Christopher Engel / Richard Holden / Klaus Schmidt / Michael Powell / /

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