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Forthcoming in: American Economic Review The Lure of Authority: Motivation and Incentive Effects of Power Ernst Fehr and Holger Herz and Tom Wilkening∗ July 2, 2012
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Document Date: 2014-08-15 00:43:41

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Russell / /

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Australia / /

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pence / /

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Jon Elster / Sergei Izmalkov / Tom Wilkening / Nikos Nikiforakis / Larry Samuelson / Holger Herz / Bob Gibbons / Chris Smith / Ernst Fehr / Ai / Sam Bowles / Klaus Schmidt / /

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King / important driver / EVP / /

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Victoria / /

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