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Appendix for: Power of Incentives in Private vs. Public Organizations by Avinash Dixit Princeton University Revised October 2004
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Document Date: 2004-10-28 11:13:32


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City

Amsterdam / New York / Cambridge / /

Company

MIT Press / /

Country

Netherlands / /

Facility

University of Science / /

IndustryTerm

offers insurance / /

Organization

Princeton University / University of Science and Technology of China / vol. / MIT / /

Person

Xinshuai Guo / Paul Milgrom / Avinash Dixit / Bengt Milgrom / John Wiley / Huang / Robert H. Litzenberger / /

Technology

Technology of China / /

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