Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders - First-price sealed-bid auction - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders„Theory and Experiment Add to Reading List Document Date: 2015-03-23 09:37:30 Open Document File Size: 299,80 KB Share Result on Facebook City Jena / Mannheim / Atlanta / Cologne / Amsterdam / Essen / / Company Cox / ECU I / / Country Germany / / Currency USD / XEU / / / Facility Institute of Economics / Karlsruhe Institute of Technology / / / IndustryTerm explicit solution / numerical solution / / Organization Institute of Economics / Institute of Technology / School of Economics / European Union / / Person Nash Equilibrium / Oliver Kirchkamp / J. Philipp Reiß‡ August / / / Position fully rational player / behavioural player / player / / SocialTag First-price sealed-bid auction Bid shading Auction Double auction Bid Vickrey auction Auctioneering Auction theory Business

Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders„Theory and ExperimentAdd to Reading List