The RAND Corporation Strategic Nonparticipation Author(s): Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu Source: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), ppPublished by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf

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Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17 Game theory Decision theory Gaming Nash equilibrium Subgame perfect equilibrium Subgame Economic equilibrium First-price sealed-bid auction Auction Strategy Sequential auction		The RAND Corporation Strategic Nonparticipation Author(s): Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu Source: The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), ppPublished by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf Add to Reading List Source URL: www.econ2.uni-bonn.de Download Document from Source Website File Size: 338,55 KB Share Document on Facebook

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