35 Intentionality as a Genuine Relation (All You Need is Love) F RANÇOIS C LEMENTZ Intentionality is commonly deﬁned either as the relational “ property ” that most mental states have to refer to, or to be about,

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Date: 2014-11-07 16:15:57 Intentionality Franz Brentano Edmund Husserl Belief Metaphysics Propositional attitude Property Category of being Qualia Philosophy Mind Philosophy of mind		35 Intentionality as a Genuine Relation (All You Need is Love) F RANÇOIS C LEMENTZ Intentionality is commonly deﬁned either as the relational “ property ” that most mental states have to refer to, or to be about, Add to Reading List Source URL: www.unige.ch Download Document from Source Website File Size: 109,84 KB Share Document on Facebook

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