0 Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics MONIKA HENZINGER, Faculty of Computer Science, University of Vienna

First Page		Document Content
Date: 2015-07-07 06:56:08 Mechanism design Game theory Decision theory Gaming Vickrey auction VickreyClarkeGroves mechanism Monotonicity VickreyClarkeGroves auction Valuation Incentive compatibility Rental harmony		0 Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits ¨ PAUL DUTTING , Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics MONIKA HENZINGER, Faculty of Computer Science, University of Vienna Add to Reading List Source URL: paulduetting.com Download Document from Source Website File Size: 287,69 KB Share Document on Facebook

	On Elicitation and Mechanism Design Bo Waggoner, UPenn January DocID: 1xVSR - View Document
	Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders Yoram Bachrach Sofia Ceppi Ian A. Kash DocID: 1xUcY - View Document
	PDF Document DocID: 1xK75 - View Document
	PDF Document DocID: 1wPek - View Document
	PDF Document DocID: 1wk8a - View Document