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Nash equilibrium / Subgame / Solution concept / Centipede game / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Sequential equilibrium / Strategy / Strategic dominance / Rationalizability / Game theory / Problem solving / Subgame perfect equilibrium
Date: 2002-10-06 15:05:31
Nash equilibrium
Subgame
Solution concept
Centipede game
Trembling hand perfect equilibrium
Sequential equilibrium
Strategy
Strategic dominance
Rationalizability
Game theory
Problem solving
Subgame perfect equilibrium

An Introduction to Game Theory Please send comments to Martin J. Osborne Department of Economics 150 St. George Street

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