Optimal Auctions with Ex-Post Verification and Limited Punishments Volodymyr Baranovskyi and Sergii Golovko ∗

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Date: 2015-12-01 11:55:25 Auction theory Game theory Auctions Pricing Business Vickrey auction Revenue equivalence Auction First-price sealed-bid auction All-pay auction Reverse auction Bidding		Optimal Auctions with Ex-Post Verification and Limited Punishments Volodymyr Baranovskyi and Sergii Golovko ∗ Add to Reading List Source URL: www.personal.psu.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 403,71 KB Share Document on Facebook

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