Public Evidence from Secret Ballots Matthew Bernhard Josh Benaloh† J. Alex Halderman Ronald L. Rivest Peter Y. A. Ryan◦ Philip B. Stark‡ Vanessa Teague. Poorvi L. Vora§ Dan S. Wallach? † Microsoft Research - Griffith John - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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Date: 2017-08-03 23:20:50 Voting Politics Elections Group decision-making Electronic voting Election technology Electoral fraud Voter-verified paper audit trail Scantegrity ThreeBallot Election audits Postal voting		Public Evidence from Secret Ballots Matthew Bernhard/ Josh Benaloh† J. Alex Halderman/ Ronald L. Rivest Peter Y. A. Ryan◦ Philip B. Stark‡ Vanessa Teague. Poorvi L. Vora§ Dan S. Wallach? † Microsoft Research / Add to Reading List Source URL: mbernhard.com Download Document from Source Website File Size: 199,76 KB Share Document on Facebook

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