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Cryptography / Computing / Scrypt / Key management / PBKDF2 / Key derivation function / CPU cache / Password / Cache / Timing attack / Lookup table
Date: 2015-09-08 06:00:03
Cryptography
Computing
Scrypt
Key management
PBKDF2
Key derivation function
CPU cache
Password
Cache
Timing attack
Lookup table

Cache-Timing Attack Against a Password-based Key Derivation Function Advisor(s): Raphael Spreitzer and Daniel Gruss Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK) Graz University of Technology, Au

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