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Unemployment Insurance Design: inducing moving and retraining John Hasslery José V. Rodríguez Moraz
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Document Date: 2014-02-12 05:48:00

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File Size: 262,51 KB

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City

Southampton / Stockholm / /

Company

ADP / McCormick / /

Country

United States / United Kingdom / Sweden / /

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Facility

University of Southampton / Stockholm University / /

IndustryTerm

menu-based insurance / search activity / Search incentives / search costs / closed-form solutions / unemployment insurance a¤ects / analytical solutions / insurance scheme / insurance / extended unemployment insurance / unemployment insurance / su¢ cient search incentives / fair insurance / unemployed search / insurance system / costly unobservable job-search / constrained optimal insurance / insurance contracts / unemployment insurance system / sign binding insurance contracts / /

Organization

Swedish Research Council / Stockholm University / CREA / CEPR / Institute for International Economic Studies / Spanish Ministry of Education / Universitat Pompeu Fabra / University of Southampton / /

Person

John Hasslery José V / Williamson / José V. Rodríguez Moraz / Christina Lönnblad / Nicola Pavoni / Kjetil Storesletten / Jaume Ventura / /

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Position

rt / planner / /

Region

continental Europe / /

Technology

3g / /

SocialTag