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Finance / Capital / Financial economics / Capital structure / Modigliani–Miller theorem / Mergers and acquisitions / Bankruptcy costs of debt / Securitization / Discounting / Economics / Corporate finance / Business
Date: 2007-04-20 13:25:15
Finance
Capital
Financial economics
Capital structure
Modigliani–Miller theorem
Mergers and acquisitions
Bankruptcy costs of debt
Securitization
Discounting
Economics
Corporate finance
Business

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE • VOL. LXII, NO. 2 • APRIL[removed]Financial Synergies and the Optimal Scope of the Firm: Implications for Mergers, Spinoffs, and Structured Finance HAYNE E. LELAND∗

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