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Interest / Crimes / Usury / Credit / Loans / Credit rationing / Debt / Payday loans in the United States / Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp. / Financial economics / Ethics / Economics
Date: 2005-11-02 11:00:03
Interest
Crimes
Usury
Credit
Loans
Credit rationing
Debt
Payday loans in the United States
Marquette Nat. Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.
Financial economics
Ethics
Economics

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES USURY CEILINGS, RELATIONSHIPS AND BANK LENDING BEHAVIOR: EVIDENCE FROM NINETEENTH CENTURY NEW YORK Howard Bodenhorn

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