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Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard∗ Daniel Gottlieb and Humberto Moreira† First Version: August, 2011. This Version: July, 2014. Abstract We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse se
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Document Date: 2014-09-22 06:21:32

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Princeton University / Johns Hopkins University / The University of Pennsylvania / University of Pennsylvania / University of Pittsburg/Carnegie Mellon University / /

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insurance literature / corporate finance / distributed reservation utilities / insurance markets / typedependent reservation utilities / insurance / insurance application / unemployment insurance / insurance firms / uncertain technology / insurance consumers / Online Appendix / insurance provision / reservation utilities / insurance contracts / insurance models / partial insurance / /

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Universidad de Chile / Wharton School / University of Pennsylvania / Princeton University / Carnegie Mellon University / PUC-Rio / Johns Hopkins University / /

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Rakesh Vohra / Moral Hazard∗ Daniel Gottlieb / Rafael Mourão / Alex Edmans / George Mailath / Jean Tirole / Humberto Moreira / Sylvain Chassang / Luca Rigotti / Eduardo Azevedo / Stephen Morris / Faruk Gul / Roger Myerson / Lucas Maestri / /

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Pennsylvania / /

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