A Practical Testing Framework for Isolating Hardware Timing Channels Jason Oberg∗ , Sarah Meiklejohn∗ , Timothy Sherwood† and Ryan Kastner∗ ∗ Computer Science and Engineering, University of California, San Die

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Date: 2018-10-23 14:58:02 Information flow Information theory CPU cache Flow Timing attack Mathematical model Mathematics Computing Knowledge		A Practical Testing Framework for Isolating Hardware Timing Channels Jason Oberg∗ , Sarah Meiklejohn∗ , Timothy Sherwood† and Ryan Kastner∗ ∗ Computer Science and Engineering, University of California, San Die Add to Reading List Source URL: smeiklej.com Download Document from Source Website File Size: 365,87 KB Share Document on Facebook

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