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Equity securities / Security / Warrant / Finance / Divided / Financial economics / Stock market / Corporate finance
Date: 2015-01-12 01:42:40
Equity securities
Security
Warrant
Finance
Divided
Financial economics
Stock market
Corporate finance

Introductory sub-table (I)(a) Name of the Company: ICRA LIMITED Scrip Code, Name of the scrip, class of security: 532835, ICRAEQ Quarter ended: 31ST DECEMBER, 2014. As a % of total no. of partly paid-up shares

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