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Macroeconomics / New Keynesian economics / Socialism / Employment compensation / Implicit contract theory / Labour economics / Employment / Principal–agent problem / Unemployment / Labor economics / Economics / Human resource management


Contract Form, Wage Flexibility and Employment
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Document Date: 2013-05-22 17:24:40


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Company

Costly Adjustment / Alternative Compensation Systems / Contract Damages / /

Country

United States / United Kingdom / /

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Facility

University of British Columbia / Robert E. Hall / Columbia University / /

IndustryTerm

worker services / measurement systems / marginal product / contract law / /

Organization

Institute for Advanced Studies / Columbia University / Movement of Wages / Leon Levy Foundation / NBER / Yale / Russell Sage Foundation / University of British Columbia / /

Person

Frans Spinnewyn / Edward P. Lazear / Thomas Lemieux / H. Lorne Carmichael / Martin N. Baily / Oliver D. Hart / Daniel Parent / David Card / Omar Azfar / Scott Schaefer / James M Malcomson / Yoshi Kanemoto / Jacob Mincer / Paul Beaudry / Paul Oyer / Costas Azariadis / Gary Becker / Andrew E. Clark / John Moore / Stephan Danninger / John DiNardo / W. Bentley / Victor P. Goldberg / Daniel Sullivan / James M. Malcomson / /

Position

model / corresponding author / /

PublishedMedium

Review of Economic Studies / Journal of Labor Economics / Industrial and Labor Relations Review / Journal of Economic Literature / The Yale Law Journal / Journal of Political Economy / Quarterly Journal of Economics / Journal Of Financial Economics / /

SocialTag