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Investment / Financial institutions / Institutional investors / Reinsurance / Self insurance / Incurred but not reported / Risk purchasing group / Captive insurance / Insurance / Financial economics / Types of insurance
Date: 2012-12-13 13:05:00
Investment
Financial institutions
Institutional investors
Reinsurance
Self insurance
Incurred but not reported
Risk purchasing group
Captive insurance
Insurance
Financial economics
Types of insurance

REASONS TO FORM A CAPTIVE 1. Reduced Reliance on Commercial Insurance As the captive matures, its surplus grows, giving it greater capacity to retain risk. Increased surplus also creates new opportunities for accessing r

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