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Political philosophy / Voting system criteria / Voting systems / Electoral systems / Range voting / Approval voting / Independence of irrelevant alternatives / Voting system / Condorcet method / Single winner electoral systems / Voting / Social choice theory


Range Voting satisfies properties that no rank-order system can Warren D. Smith Center for Range Voting, 21 Shore Oaks Drive, Stony Brook NY 11790
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Document Date: 2007-04-28 12:11:27

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Company

ABC / Oxford Clarendon Press / AC AB / Simmons / /

Country

United States / /

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IndustryTerm

rank-ballot systems / web posts / web page corresponding / weighted positional systems / rank-order voting systems / trivial systems / even voting systems / /

NaturalFeature

Forest Simmons / /

Organization

International Criminal Court / Warren D. Smith Center for Range Voting / Center For Range Voting / /

Person

Barry Nalebuff / Warren D. Smith / Jan Kok / Mark Fey / Donald E. Campbell / Markus Schulze / Jerry S.Kelly / H. Peyton Young / Mike Ossipoff / Kenneth O. May / Jonathan Levin / Chris Benham / John H. Smith / /

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PoliticalEvent

runoff voting / general election / /

Position

author / CRV co-founder / /

ProvinceOrState

Copeland / British Columbia / /

PublishedMedium

Mathematics Magazine / Economics Letters / /

TVShow

Q.E.D. / Q.E.D. 5 / /

Technology

cloning / html / /

URL

http /

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