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Date: 2016-06-17 06:57:25Game theory Non-cooperative games Evolutionary game theory Nash equilibrium Strategy Solution concept Evolutionarily stable strategy Zero-sum game Normal-form game Folk theorem Epsilon-equilibrium | Equilibria in Finite Games Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy by Anshul GuptaAdd to Reading ListSource URL: cgi.csc.liv.ac.ukDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 1,23 MBShare Document on Facebook |
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