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 Date: 2004-12-08 03:08:16Auction theory Decision theory Problem solving Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction Auction Utility Indifference price Welfare economics Game theory Auctioneering Business |
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Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders Christian Borgs∗ Jennifer Chayes∗ Nicole Immorlica† ∗ Mohammad Mahdian
![BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/26edde5edc3f5ad99d2c4f69417dfd70.jpg "BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win")
