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Ontology / Gottfried Leibniz / Philosophical logic / Principles / Possibility / Indiscernibles / Identity of indiscernibles / Difference / Reality / Philosophy / Metaphysics / Logic


Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1999, 77 (4), pp[removed]LEIBNIZ’S ARGUMENT FOR THE IDENTITY OF INDISCERNIBLES IN HIS CORRESPONDENCE WITH CLARKE1
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Document Date: 2009-03-18 12:19:46


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City

Manchester / Cambridge / London / Buenos Aires / /

Company

Oxford University Press / Manchester University Press / /

Country

United Kingdom / Argentina / /

Facility

CORRESPONDENCE WITH CLARKE1 Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra Churchill College / Churchill College / /

Movie

East/West / /

Organization

Churchill College / CLARKE1 Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra Churchill College / Oxford University / /

Person

Juan Rodriguez Larreta / Benson Mates / Max Black / Ezequiel de Olaso / Sufficient Reason / Hugh Mellor / Clarke Leibniz / /

Position

learned author / /

PublishedMedium

Australasian Journal of Philosophy / Philosophy of Science / /

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