Back to Results
First PageMeta Content
Economics / Nash equilibrium / Extensive-form game / Determinacy / Normal distribution / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Structure / Epsilon-equilibrium / Game theory / Problem solving / Mathematics


Regret Minimization in Games with Incomplete Information Martin Zinkevich Michael Johanson
Add to Reading List

Document Date: 2010-10-06 15:11:14

Open Document

File Size: 243,65 KB

Share Result on Facebook

City

Cambridge / /

Company

Neural Information Processing Systems / MIT Press / Michael Bowling Computing Science Department University of Alberta Edmonton AB / Carmelo Piccione Computing Science Department University of Alberta Edmonton AB / /

/

IndustryTerm

benchmark server / Gradient-based algorithms / regret matching algorithm / recent state-of-the-art algorithms / regret algorithms / No-regret algorithms / considerable additional technology / near equilibrium solution / equilibrium solution / regret minimizing algorithms / e - commerce / pokerspecific algorithm / approximate solutions / learning algorithms / online learning concept / /

Organization

H\Z / Poker Academy / MIT / University of Alberta Edmonton / /

Person

Regret Extensive / Nash Equilibria / Ai / Martin Zinkevich / Michael Johanson / /

Position

first player / competitive texas hold’em poker player / chance player / associated player / controlling player / If player / Rt / row player / player / overall value Pto player / /

Product

Canada T6G2E8 / /

ProvinceOrState

Massachusetts / /

PublishedMedium

Games and Economic Behavior / /

Technology

regret algorithms / regret matching algorithm / four processors / Lagrangian Hedging algorithms / Gradient-based algorithms / No-regret algorithms / 280 processor / regret minimizing algorithms / /

SocialTag