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Game theory / Nash equilibrium / Economic equilibrium / Thermodynamic equilibrium / Intuitive criterion / Bayesian game
Date: 2015-05-28 07:52:17
Game theory
Nash equilibrium
Economic equilibrium
Thermodynamic equilibrium
Intuitive criterion
Bayesian game

Discussion Paper NoWho goes first? Strategic Delay and Learning by Waiting Peter Wagner *

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