Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal Roger B. Myerson Econometrica, Vol. 51, No. 6. (Nov., 1983), pp[removed]Stable URL: http: links.jstor.org sici?sici=[removed]%[removed])51:6<1767:MDBAIP>2.0.CO;2- - JSTOR - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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	Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal Roger B. Myerson Econometrica, Vol. 51, No. 6. (Nov., 1983), pp[removed]Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=[removed]%[removed]%2951%3A6%3C1767%3AMDBAIP%3E2.0.CO%3B2- Add to Reading List Document Date: 2007-08-17 15:32:56 Open Document File Size: 653,96 KB Share Result on Facebook Company Wilson / Rothschild and Stiglitz / / / Facility Northwestern University / Stanford University / Stable URL / / IndustryTerm conditionally-expected utilities / mechanisms strong solutions / insurance / insurance policy / mechanical information processor / low quality car / / Organization Econometric Society / Center for Advanced Study / Stanford University / Northwestern University / Math Center / / Person Roger B. Myerson / Roger B. Myerson Econometrica / Raviv / / / Position academic economist / mediator / player / trustworthy mediator / / SportsLeague Stanford University / / Technology mechanical information processor / / URL http / SocialTag Economics Information Market failure Mechanism design Social choice theory Revelation principle Principal–agent problem Incentive compatibility Roger Myerson Game theory

Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal Roger B. Myerson Econometrica, Vol. 51, No. 6. (Nov., 1983), pp[removed]Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=[removed]%[removed]%2951%3A6%3C1767%3AMDBAIP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Add to Reading List