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Science / Parliament of Great Britain / 18th century in the United States / Age of Enlightenment / American Revolution / Self-confirming equilibrium / Jack N. Rakove / Nash equilibrium / Patriot / Game theory / Economic theories / Economics


Rough Draft: Do Not Cite or Quote Without Permission Rationality, Inaccurate Mental Models, and Self-Confirming Equilibrium: A New Understanding of the American Revolution
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Document Date: 2002-07-01 16:18:03


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File Size: 294,98 KB

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Continent

America / /

Country

United Kingdom / /

Facility

Stanford University / /

Organization

Haas School of Business / Department of Political Science / Historians of the Revolution / Hoover Institution / Stanford University / Department of History / /

Person

Mathew McCubbins / Colin Camerer / Thomas Sargent / Paul Milgrom / Douglass North / Rabin / James Morrow / Robert Powell / David Laitin / Robert Wilson / Robert Gibbons / Kalai / Jack Rakove / Ward C. Krebs / Charles Beard / Stephen Krasner / Barry R. Weingast / John Ferejohn / Andy Rutten / /

Position

prominent historian / Professor / player / Professor and Chair / /

PublishedMedium

the Progressive / /

SportsLeague

Stanford University / /

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