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Revelation principle / Incentive compatibility / General equilibrium theory / Collusion / Bayesian game / Welfare economics / Economics / Game theory / Problem solving / Mechanism design


Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation Jean-Jacques Laont David Martimort Revised Version: December 98
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Document Date: 2004-04-22 17:00:00

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File Size: 377,63 KB

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City

Berlin / /

Company

A1 / /

Facility

University of Alabama / University Pompeu Fabra / University College London / University of Maryland / Bocconi University / Humbolt University / University of California at Berkeley / /

IndustryTerm

communication technology / /

Organization

University of California / University of Maryland / Paris / University College London / University of Alabama / Bocconi University / Stanford Business School / Humbolt University / /

Person

Andrew Postlewaite / Robert Wilson / Antoine Faure-Grimaud / Tomas Sjostrom / David Martimort / Patrick Rey / Oliver Hart / Mike Riordan / Ai / Dimitri Vayanos / Eric Maskin / Jean-Jacques La / /

Position

side-contract mechanism designer / planner / Model 2.1 Technology / /

ProvinceOrState

Alabama / Maryland / California / /

Technology

2.1 Technology / communication technology / /

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