Achieving Allocatively-Efficient and Strongly Budget-Balanced Mechanisms in the Network Flow Domain for Bounded-Rational Agents Yoram Bachrach and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein {yori, jeff School of Engineering a - Jeff Clarke - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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Date: 2005-07-11 16:49:14 Game theory Network flow Auctioneering Networks NP-complete problems Vertex cover Maximum flow problem Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction Strategyproof Graph theory Mathematics Theoretical computer science		Achieving Allocatively-Efficient and Strongly Budget-Balanced Mechanisms in the Network Flow Domain for Bounded-Rational Agents Yoram Bachrach and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein {yori, jeff}@cs.huji.ac.il School of Engineering a Add to Reading List Source URL: www.ijcai.org Download Document from Source Website File Size: 71,81 KB Share Document on Facebook

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