Representing an ordering when the population varies John Broome University of Oxford and Australian National University I am extremely grateful to Sarah Moss for very helpful comments, an

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Equality versus priority: a useful distinction John Broome My book Weighing Goods contains a discussion of egalitarianism and prioritarianism.1 At the time the book was written, prioritarianism was well established among

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Does rationality give us reasons1 John Broome 1. Introduction Most of us take it for granted that we ought to be rational – to have the bundle of dispositions and abilities that constitute the faculty of rationality. M

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A comment on Temkin’s trade-offs John Broome When people first built bridges, they managed without much theory. They could judge a log by eye, relying on their intuition. Their intuitions were reliable, being built on

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• Philosophy
• Ethics
• Meta-ethics
• Larry Temkin
• Mere addition paradox
• Derek Parfit
• Ethical intuitionism
• Intuition
• Reason
• Temkin

Practical reasoning John Broome University of Oxford For: Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality, edited by José Bermùdez and Alan Millar, Oxford University Press. This paper was written while I was a v

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• Philosophy
• Logic
• Reasoning
• Abstraction
• Reason
• Inference
• Practical reason
• Normative
• Argument
• David Hume
• Isought problem
• Defeasible reasoning

Can there be a preference-based utilitarianism? * John Broome Department of Moral Philosophy, University of St Andrews For Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism: Proceedings of the Caen Conference in Honour of

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• Ethics
• Philosophy
• Utilitarianism
• Classical liberalism
• Social philosophy
• Fellows of the Econometric Society
• Consumer theory
• Preference
• Act utilitarianism
• Utility
• John Harsanyi
• MyersBriggs Type Indicator

Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values? John Broome University of Oxford From: Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier, edited by Christopher Morris and Arthur

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• Reasoning
• Philosophy
• Logic
• Cognition
• Reason
• Practical reason
• Argument
• Normative
• Deductive reasoning
• Ethics
• Rationality
• Defeasible reasoning

NORMATIVE REQUIREMENTS1 John Broome, University of Oxford Ratio, ), pp. 398–419, and in Normativity, edited by Jonathan Dancy, Blackwell, 2000, pp. 78–99. Abstract Normative requirements are often overlooked,

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• Philosophy
• Logic
• Philosophical logic
• Reasoning
• Philosophy of law
• Epistemology
• Arguments
• Reason
• Normative
• Norm
• Deontic logic
• Ethics

Is rationality normative? John Broome 1. The normative question Rationality requires various things of you. For example, it requires you not to have contradictory beliefs, to believe what follows by modus ponens from thi

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• Reasoning
• Epistemology
• Social philosophy
• Autonomy
• Philosophy of mind
• Rationality
• Instrumental and value rationality
• Reason
• Normative
• Irrationality
• Belief
• Communicative rationality

Measuring the burden of disease John Broome 1. Introduction A important part of the WHO’s work has been to develop and publish summary measures of the burden of disease for different nations. The WHO aims to measure bo

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• Quality of life
• Welfare
• Well-being
• Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative
• Disability-adjusted life year