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Philosophy / Delict / Conditionals / Philosophy of science / Causation / Jonathan Schaffer / Indeterminism / Negligence / Clark Glymour / Law / Causality / Tort law
Date: 2011-02-04 23:12:31
Philosophy
Delict
Conditionals
Philosophy of science
Causation
Jonathan Schaffer
Indeterminism
Negligence
Clark Glymour
Law
Causality
Tort law

Legal Theory, [removed]), 259–297.  C Cambridge University Press[removed]11 $15.00 + 00 doi:[removed]S1352325210000224 CONTRASTIVE CAUSATION

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