First Page | Document Content | |
---|---|---|
Date: 2015-11-11 14:55:31Game theory Voting system criteria Decision theory Nash equilibrium Condorcet criterion Economic equilibrium Voting Thermodynamic equilibrium Independence of irrelevant alternatives | Mookherjee EC 721 Ec721 PROBLEM SET 3 SOLUTIONS 1. Suppose the policy space is a one dimensional real variable p, there are a finite (odd) number of voters each with single peaked preferences, with a median ideal pointAdd to Reading ListSource URL: people.bu.eduDownload Document from Source WebsiteFile Size: 95,79 KBShare Document on Facebook |
PAPER CODE -UGLSET C ) Q.NoDocID: 1rtWT - View Document | |
SeptemberAlternative Voting Systems: Facts and Issues IntroductionDocID: 1qZUM - View Document | |
PAPER CODE -UGLSET B ) Q.NoDocID: 1qYOo - View Document | |
A characterization of single-peaked single-crossing domain Edith Elkind University of Oxford based on joint work withDocID: 1q2Hh - View Document | |
Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation Author(s): Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu Source: Econometrica, Vol. 63, No. 6 (Nov., 1995), ppPublished by: The Econometric Society Stable URL: httpDocID: 1pdOt - View Document |