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 Date: 2014-03-26 06:49:17Auction theory Game theory Mechanism design Mathematics Auctions Marketing Vickrey auction Vector-valued function Auction Revenue equivalence Envelope theorem |
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Journal of Economic Theory 85, 258Article ID jeth, available online at http:www.idealibrary.com on Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities* Philippe Jehiel
![BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win](https://www.pdfsearch.io/img/26edde5edc3f5ad99d2c4f69417dfd70.jpg "BNE and Auction Theory Homework 1. For two agents with values U [0, 1] and U [0, 2], respectively: (a) show that the first-price auction is not socially optimal in BNE. (b) give an auction with “pay your bid if you win")
