Later-no-harm criterion - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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Date: 2012-01-08 00:26:14 Social choice theory Political philosophy Condorcet method Condorcet criterion Voting system Later-no-harm criterion Instant-runoff voting Monotonicity criterion Ranked pairs Voting Voting system criteria Single winner electoral systems		Add to Reading List Source URL: economics.stanford.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 329,82 KB Share Document on Facebook

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