Computing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Stochastic Games Joshua Letchford1 and Liam MacDermed2 and Vincent Conitzer1 and Ronald Parr1 and Charles L. Isbell2 1 Duke University, Department of Computer Science, Durham,

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Date: 2013-04-16 11:50:53 Nash equilibrium Correlated equilibrium Best response Stackelberg competition Strategic dominance Bargaining problem Strategy Outcome Extensive-form game Game theory Problem solving Economics		Computing Optimal Strategies to Commit to in Stochastic Games Joshua Letchford1 and Liam MacDermed2 and Vincent Conitzer1 and Ronald Parr1 and Charles L. Isbell2 1 Duke University, Department of Computer Science, Durham, Add to Reading List Source URL: www.cc.gatech.edu Download Document from Source Website File Size: 1,08 MB Share Document on Facebook

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