Philip Goff University of Liverpool ANU There is no even vaguely plausible physicalist theory of phenomenal concepts There is a sense in which the scientific revolution began when Descartes offered an entirely mathemati - Liverpool - Document - PDFSEARCH.IO

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Date: 2012-01-09 02:03:42 Materialism Physicalism Ontology Metaphysics Concept Consciousness Type physicalism Mind Cognitive science Philosophy of mind		Philip Goff University of Liverpool/ANU There is no even vaguely plausible physicalist theory of phenomenal concepts There is a sense in which the scientific revolution began when Descartes offered an entirely mathemati Add to Reading List Source URL: www.humanities.uwa.edu.au Download Document from Source Website File Size: 22,50 KB Share Document on Facebook

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