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Procurement / Auction theory / Business law / Contract A / Purchasing / First-price sealed-bid auction / Contract B / Bid bond / Construction / Business / Contract law / Auctioneering
Date: 2014-11-07 15:31:15
Procurement
Auction theory
Business law
Contract A
Purchasing
First-price sealed-bid auction
Contract B
Bid bond
Construction
Business
Contract law
Auctioneering

DIVISION OF SOIL CONSERVATION DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND LAND STEWARDSHIP STATE OF IOWA LOGAN AML RECLAMATION PROJECT SE Section 14, Township 74 North, Range 17 West

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